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Abstract – Introduction. The modern health care system is func-
tioning in the era of dynamic development of technology of pro-
cessing increasing resources of knowledge and information. It is 
carried out both in diagnostics and in processes directly related to 
the performance of medical procedures thanks to improvements 
in health data processing techniques. At the same time, a large-
scale support of both knowledge resources and organizational 
processes is provided by specially adapted computer systems. 
Systems belonging to the so-called artificial intelligence are 
emerging. All these phenomena are related to the generation of 
more and more data and information about the patient's health. 
The aim of the study.  The aim of the study was to discuss the 
most important problems concerning the safety of medical data in 
the light of new technological and legal challenges. 
Selection of material. The search was conducted in the Scopus 
database using the following terms: medical data security, IT 
technologies 2016-2019. The literature found in the Google 
Scholar database was analyzed in terms of the largest number of 
citations. Such selected literature was used as a material for the 
preparation of the present paper. 
Conclusions. New regulations on the identification of trust ser-
vices, personal data security and cyber-security will also have a 
broad application in health care. Most of them were issued in the 
form of regulations ensuring their universal applicability 
throughout the EU. Unfortunately, the implementation of new 
legal solutions at the level of health care may be difficult, if only 
because of the costs of implementation. Both the highly desirable 
system of identification of persons providing health services and 
patients, the universal implementation of trust services and the 
classification of some hospitals as operators of key services are 
very high financial burdens for medical entities. On this occasion, 
we may wonder whether at least some of the required solutions 
should not be financed by the state, e.g. issuing certificates for 
advanced electronic signatures and seals or making cloud solu-
tions widely available for keeping electronic medical records. 
 
Key words - medical data processing, information technologies, 
legal regulations in health care. 
 
Streszczenie – Wstęp. Współczesny system ochrony zdrowia 
funkcjonuje w erze dynamicznego rozwoju technologii przetwa 
 
rzania zwiększających się zasobów wiedzy oraz informacji. Do-
konuje się on zarówno w diagnostyce, jak również w procesach 
związanych bezpośrednio z wykonywaniem zabiegów medycz-
nych dzięki udoskonaleniom technik przetwarzania danych o 
stanie zdrowia. Równolegle następuje stosowane na szeroką skalę 
wspomaganie zasobów zarówno wiedzy, jak i procesów organi-
zacyjnych przez specjalnie przystosowane do tego systemy kom-
puterowe. Pojawiają się systemy zaliczane do tzw. sztucznej inte-
ligencji. Wszystkie powyższe zjawiska związane są z generowa-
niem coraz większej ilości danych i informacji o stanie zdrowia 
pacjenta.  
Cel pracy. Celem pracy było omówione najważniejsze problemy 
dotyczące bezpieczeństwa danych medycznych w świetle no-
wych wyzwań technologicznych i prawnych. 
Dobór materiału. Poszukiwania przeprowadzono w bazie Scopus 
używając pojęć : bezpieczeństwa danych medycznych, technolo-
gie informatyczne 2016-2019r. Znalezione piśmiennictwo w ba-
zie Google Scholar przeanalizowano pod kątem największej licz-
by cytowań. Tak wyselekcjonowane piśmiennictwo posłużyło za 
materiał do opracowania niniejszej pracy.  
Wnioski.  Nowe przepisy dotyczące identyfikacji usług zaufania, 
bezpieczeństwa danych osobowych i bezpieczeństwa cyberne-
tycznego będą miały również szerokie zastosowanie w opiece 
zdrowotnej. Większość z nich została wydana w formie rozpo-
rządzeń zapewniających ich powszechne stosowanie w całej UE. 
Niestety, wdrożenie nowych rozwiązań prawnych na poziomie 
opieki zdrowotnej może być trudne, choćby ze względu na koszty 
wdrożenia. Zarówno wysoce pożądany system identyfikacji osób 
świadczących usługi zdrowotne, jak i pacjentów, powszechne 
wdrażanie usług zaufania oraz klasyfikacja niektórych szpitali 
jako operatorów kluczowych usług stanowią bardzo duże obcią-
żenie finansowe dla podmiotów medycznych. Przy tej okazji 
można się zastanowić, czy przynajmniej część wymaganych roz-
wiązań nie powinna być finansowana przez państwo, np. wyda-
wanie certyfikatów dla zaawansowanych podpisów i pieczęci 
elektronicznych lub udostępnianie rozwiązań chmury do prze-
chowywania elektronicznej dokumentacji medycznej. 
 
Słowa kluczowe – przetwarzanie danych medycznych, technolo-
gie informatyczne, regulacje prawne w ochronie zdrowia.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
ecent years in the healthcare sector have undoubtedly 
been a time of information technology development. 
This development concerns both technical devices 
used in diagnostics and processes directly related to the 
performance of medical procedures, as well as new and 
improved techniques of processing health data. There is 
also a large-scale support of knowledge resources and or-
ganizational processes by specially adapted computer sys-
tems. Systems belonging to the so-called artificial intelli-
gence are emerging. 
Systems of collecting, processing and archiving data 
concerning health condition and processes of diagnosis and 
treatment of patients are the basis for efficient functioning 
of the health care system at the individual, local, regional 
or central level.  Currently, we can observe several signifi-
cant phenomena in the field of health data processing: 
1) Standardisation of trust services and technical solutions 
required for the creation of electronic documents and 
implementation in EU countries of the identification 
mechanisms necessary for their creation The problem 
of the current Polish health care system is the lack of 
tools for identification required for the service of 
health services (the so-called high level). 
2) Changing the type of devices used for processing data 
from stationary to mobile. It should be noted that the 
mass transfer of operations performed so far by desk-
top computers and laptops to mobile devices - tablets, 
smartphones, etc. Should be noted. The use of devices 
supporting treatment processes as well as a wider and 
wider range of new diagnostics in relation to the pa-
tient results in the process of generating information 
that we have never had to deal with before. 
3) Widespread use of cloud computing to process health 
data.  
4) Generation and processing of health data, including their 
analysis by IT systems and technical devices without 
human intervention, the so-called artificial intelli-
gence. Using big data algorithms to simulate future 
health care phenomena (e.g. maps of health needs). 
5) Technologies that enable the personalisation of available 
data sets, previously considered as anonymous and not 
subject to regulations protecting personal data. 
6) Attempting to introduce blockchain technology to se-
curely collect patient data. 
 
All these phenomena are related to the generation of 
more and more data and information about the patient's 
health. It is caused mainly by a greater number of recom-
mended and technologically advanced diagnostics, but also 
by the introduction of analytical and settlement systems at 
the national and regional levels, as well as by a faster than 
so far process of introducing electronic databases. The 
classic division of data and information in health care de-
pending on a (physical) data carrier is becoming a thing of 
the past. Classical medical documentation recorded on pa-
per will still accompany the health care system, but the 
time is approaching when the final end of its creation will 
be reached. Paper-based documentation cannot meet the 
challenges of time. It is often more and more dispersed, 
and at the same time there is a lack of an entity that has the 
technical and legal capacity to coordinate all the patient's 
data. This increase in the amount of data and information 
processed requires authorised users to ensure proper, trou-
ble-free processing and an adequate level of security. The 
article discusses the most important issues concerning the 
security of medical data in the light of new technological 
and legal challenges. Without their proper solution, both 
on the local and central level (health care information sys-
tem), it is difficult to talk about building an efficient in-
formation system supporting the health care functioning. 
 
R 
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II. PATIENT DATA SECURITY - DIFFERENT 
DATA SOURCES 
 
 
It should be emphasized that only a small part of data 
and information about the patient's health is collected in 
the patient's medical records (the equivalent of which may 
today be an electronic patient record or a more commonly 
used name, an electronic health record). A large part of 
data and information is processed in numerous databases 
maintained by healthcare providers, payers, including the 
National Health Fund, entities obliged to keep medical 
records and by suppliers of devices and software, about the 
existence of which the patient often knows nothing. This 
does not mean, however, that information on health condi-
tion collected outside medical records is deprived of pro-
tection. Most data processors try to provide technical solu-
tions that ensure their security. Some databases are pro-
tected by specific provisions. 
Security of data and information collected about patients 
is to be ensured primarily by regulations dedicated to col-
lecting and processing of data on health condition.  They 
regulate in detail the processes of storage, transfer and pro-
tection of data obtained during the patient's stay in a medi-
cal entity, including, inter alia, determining the detailed 
scope of data on a specific patient, to which specific enti-
ties are entitled. However, all unregulated areas of health 
data processing are subject to the general provisions on the 
protection of personal data. 
The development of technology and the emergence of 
the data market have caused considerable problems in the 
application of legal provisions in force in the EU. 
Traditionally, regulations ensuring personal data protec-
tion divide protected data into two groups: data protection 
and data protection:  
 ordinary data containing personal data not belonging to 
the group of sensitive (sensitive) data - this is the case, 
inter alia, in the labour code, 
 a specific category of personal data (so-called sensitive 
data) - the catalogue of this category of data is defined 
and the breach may have more serious consequences 
than a breach of ordinary personal data.   
 
In the literature on the subject, it is more and more often 
stated that the above section is outdated. The mechanism of 
ensuring the security of processed personal data, both or-
dinary and sensitive, is based on the belief that the entities 
that are legally empowered to process personal data will 
ensure their security. A category of data of particular im-
portance for the privacy of an individual, the so-called sen-
sitive data (e.g. health data, genetic data) was introduced 
and separate requirements for handling this group of data 
were created. This was intended to give confidence in the 
greater guarantees associated with the protection of special 
categories of data (sensitive data). Data processors must 
select appropriate techniques and organisation solutions to 
ensure that the data processed are properly secured. 
Whether the process of securing data adopted by the entity 
processing them is correct is subject to assessment by a 
specially appointed authority. Such a solution functioned 
for many years and was generally accepted. However, the 
development of data processing technology and post-
universal turnover of personal data sets caused a situation 
in which most of the sets considered until recently to be 
impossible to identify nowadays become sets containing 
personal data.  
At the same time, there is a concept of information au-
tonomy, according to which individuals, by controlling the 
sharing of information about themselves, may effectively 
limit access to them, and consequently set a limit to the 
protection of their privacy. [1] The consequence of this 
state of affairs is the information obligation and the re-
quirement of consent of the entity to process its personal 
data. The data subject should be informed about the pro-
cessing of his or her data by a specific controller. 
 
 
III. ENCRYPTION, PSEUDONYMISATION AND 
ANONYMISATION 
 
 
RODO (General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679) 
indicates possible techniques that affect the security of the 
processed data. Their application results in the exclusion of 
the possibility of processing by unauthorized persons. The 
regulations indicate as recommended security techniques: 
data encryption and pseudonymisation. (Article 32) [2] At 
the same time, the rules provided for a situation in which 
very complex, time-consuming and costly steps were taken 
to identify individuals hidden by technical security 
measures. In such a case, however, the data thus concealed 
cannot be considered as personal data.  
In both pseudonymisation and encryption techniques, it is 
possible to identify oneself using the appropriate keys un-
der the control of the controller, and therefore personal 
data are still involved. This is not the case when an anon-
ymisation technique is applied to public data. Anonymisa-
tion is not defined either in the Act on Personal Data Pro-
tection or in the RODO. Only recital 26 of the Preamble of 
the RODO mentions it. The definition is contained in ISO 
9100:2011. This is a process by which information identi-
fying a person is irreversibly altered in such a way that the 
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person (information subject) can no longer be identified, 
directly or indirectly, by the personal data controller or in 
cooperation with any other entity. Anonymisation is neces-
sary, among others, to make available, for example, data 
on the state of health for scientific and research purposes. 
 
 
IV. PROTECTION OF NON-PERSONAL DATA 
 
 
From the end of 2018, non-personal data shall also be 
protected. Until now, mainly personal data to which identi-
ty can be attributed have been protected. The processing of 
other data was not regulated until the Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the framework 
for the free movement of non-personal data in the Europe-
an Union entered into force. [3] The main objectives of the 
Regulation are: 
 to improve the cross-border mobility of non-personal 
data in the single market, which is currently 
hampered in many member states by location 
restrictions or legal uncertainty in the market, 
 ensure that competent authorities retain full powers to 
request and access data for regulatory control, 
including inspections and audits,  
 facilitate professional users to change service 
providers, store or otherwise process data and 
transfer their data without creating an undue burden 
on service providers or creating market distortions. 
[4] 
 
This Regulation applies to non-personal data, i.e. data 
which in no way identifies a natural person. Non-personal 
data are all data that are not personal data within the mean-
ing of the RODO (Article 3). [2] Such information in-
cludes, for example, information: 
 information relating to the web pages viewed, 
 data containing the number of visits and the time 
spent on a specific website, 
 big data analyses, 
 IT algorithms, 
 data related to maintenance of industrial machinery, 
 data produced by machines or anonymised data sets 
- unless this information relates to an identified or 
identifiable natural person. 
 
Non-personal data are inextricably linked with personal 
data. In case of doubt, this Regulation will be superseded 
by the RODO. [5] There is also provision for data protec-
tion if technological developments make it possible to de-
anonymise previously anonymised data, resulting in a 
change in their legal classification from non-personal data 
to personal data, in which case RODO will apply. 
The principle of free movement within the European 
Union has been introduced for non-personal data, except 
where a restriction or prohibition would be justified for 
security reasons. In other words, it is not possible to indi-
cate, for example, that data generated in health care must 
be processed only in a designated EU country where ser-
vices have been provided.  
It is also important to require that the relevant authorities 
have the power to request and access data for the purpose 
of regulatory control, inspections and audits. This will en-
sure that competent authorities cannot be denied access to 
data even though the data are processed in another Member 
State. An example is the control of electronic medical rec-
ords processed in any EU country. 
The protection of data on health condition classified for 
the most part as a specific category of data (so-called sensi-
tive data) is to be ensured by appropriate legal regulations, 
both at national and EU level. The fundamental role is 
played by the RODO and the Act on Patients' Rights and 
the Act on Information Systems in Health Care. The re-
cently adopted Polish law implementing the RODO has 
adapted nearly 170 different laws to the requirements of 
the EU data protection regulation. [6] This group includes 
regulations concerning medical professions and systemic 
regulations in the field of health care. 
 
 
V. DATA PROTECTION OF INTERNET USERS 
  
 
We are still working on a regulation supplementing the 
protection of e-Privacy personal data. [7] It is aimed at 
reducing the practice of uncontrolled processing of Internet 
users' data, which often results in significant interference 
with their privacy. It will specify, among others, the scope 
of technologies whose use will be subject to restrictions - 
cookies - but also any other technologies (e.g. so-called 
"pixels"; "web beacons"; "spyware"), which allow to iden-
tify or track the user, monitor his actions or locate. Simply 
mentioned is fingerprinting (i.e., tagging) technology, 
which enables the creation of a unique device identifier, 
without any information being placed on the user's device 
itself, by using a unique combination of information sent 
by the device while visiting websites or using applications. 
[8] 
Most of the regulations currently being implemented and 
prepared are intended to contribute to ensuring data securi-
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ty in the technology environment, which in general is 
largely incomprehensible to most people. Their main task 
is to implement and adapt the applied technological solu-
tions to the ever-changing standards. This is primarily re-
lated to the fact that the data processing entity provides 
appropriate devices, software or access to solutions deliv-
ered via the network. It also requires the data processing 
entities to undertake a number of organisational and tech-
nical actions. Their result is to ensure cooperation, both in 
a specific unit and in the health care system, equipment 
and software, and to ensure the safety of operations.  
The regulations indicate the use of the indicated tech-
niques as those that will either contribute to the protection 
of personal data (encryption, pseudonymisation) or after 
the expiry of the purpose of processing (or the time limit 
for data storage required by law) will lead to a change in 
the category of personal data from personal data to non-
personal data (anonymisation). They do not specify any 
specific recommended solutions. In this case, the legal ba-
sis for data protection is changed to a much less stringent 
one. Difficulties may be related to the assessment of the 
effectiveness of the technical solutions used to anonymise 
the data. A number of examples point to misapplication of 
these solutions. 
 
 
VI. WHOSE OWNERSHIP IS IT OF THE 
PATIENT'S DATA? 
 
 
The question arises as to who owns the data collected 
about the patient and who can process it outside of the pa-
tient. It seems that in the era of the information society this 
issue needs to be finally resolved. On the one hand, there is 
the right to privacy and the legally guaranteed access of 
patients to medical records. On the other hand, there is the 
public interest, which serves primarily to study phenomena 
occurring in health care, both for research purposes and to 
observe the demand for services and medicines, including 
simulating phenomena that will occur in a few years' time. 
It is worth noting that in the era of electronic medical doc-
umentation we do not solve the problem of ownership of 
the documentation itself, but the data contained in the doc-
umentation. Electronic medical documentation is each time 
created from data processed in electronic databases and 
serves for The postulated condition is full control of the 
patient over what data and information concerning him/her 
are stored, processed and made available. As a result, the 
patient has the right to require that the data concerning 
him/her obtained during the treatment process be used only 
to the extent that he or she accepts it. Only in exceptional 
situations, justified by the needs of the state, data may be 
processed by entities designated by law. The fundamental 
problem that arises is the real willingness of the patient to 
engage in the process of data control. However, it is not an 
easy solution to implement. There are two major barriers 
here: 
 the patient's willingness to get involved in the process 
of controlling his or her health status, 
 to make it technically possible for the patient to 
observe who is processing his or her health data.  
 
In areas where there are legal regulations for the pro-
cessing of health data, the patient usually receives infor-
mation about the data collected about him or her. It is 
worse in situations where we are dealing with the Internet 
of Things (IoT) or autonomous devices belonging to the 
so-called artificial intelligence. The concept of IoT is wide-
ly used by the healthcare sector. Nowadays, almost every 
person has a mobile phone and usually it is a smartphone. 
This makes it possible to monitor the state of health,  
especially in older people. It is now possible to diagnose 
the patient's health condition at a distance and send the 
data to the doctor. Thanks to a system of sensors, e.g. at 
home, as well as personal belongings such as watches, 
jewellery or clothes, it is possible to monitor basic health 
parameters such as blood pressure, body temperature, glu-
cose levels and heart rate. All data collected by the sensors 
can be transferred quickly to the doctor. In this way, they 
create electronic medical records of the patient. 9] Increas-
ingly, applications are breaking down the history of our 
ailments, medications, and so on. Often, problems arise 
from determining the ownership of devices and software, 
which in turn raises the following questions: who is the 
owner of the collected data? Are there any restrictions on 
transferring data to third parties? [10] It can be assumed 
that in the coming years the "right to be forgotten" will be 
modified in order to extend this right also to the area of 
medical data. 
A major challenge for legislation is to define the prob-
lem of ownership of patient data. This is related to the most 
important issue of the patient's role in the health care sys-
tem. It is necessary to define concretely who is the owner 
of information about the patient, and not only those con-
tained in medical records. The right of the patient to influ-
ence the scope of the data processed by him or her (consent 
to the processing of data and their scope) should be ana-
lyzed very carefully. As a result, the issue of who decides 
about collecting data in the patient's record, transferring 
them to other entities and deleting data from the record 
should be resolved. We are talking here about information 
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collected in one place and coming from different entities. 
This does not apply to documentation collected by entities 
providing health services in their databases and used for 
settlement purposes and possibly for evidentiary purposes 
in court cases. 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
New regulations on the identification of trust services, 
personal data security and cyber-security will also have a 
broad application in health care. Most of them were issued 
in the form of regulations ensuring their universal applica-
bility throughout the EU. Unfortunately, the implementa-
tion of new legal solutions at the level of health care may 
be difficult, if only because of the costs of implementation. 
Both the highly desirable system of identification of per-
sons providing health services and patients, the universal 
implementation of trust services and the classification of 
some hospitals as operators of key services are very high 
financial burdens for medical entities. On this occasion, we 
may wonder whether at least some of the required solu-
tions should not be financed by the state, e.g. issuing cer-
tificates for advanced electronic signatures and seals or 
making cloud solutions widely available for keeping elec-
tronic medical records: 
  it is also worth noting the communication with the 
health care environment. Even if all the actions taken 
recently are right and generally acceptable to the envi-
ronment, there is a lack of information about the pro-
jects being carried out and actions supporting the state 
in the process of computerisation. In other words, it is 
necessary to explain what are the objectives of long-
term tasks undertaken, what tools are necessary for 
their implementation and what is the role and support 
of the state in the process of their implementation. 
First of all, it should be remembered that when defin-
ing the objectives, one should take into account both 
patients and the diverse environment of entities 
providing health services.  
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